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THE STATE’S MONOPOLY OF FORCE AND THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
Robert Leider 
ABSTRACT—In debates over the Second Amendment, the conventional 
view is that the government ought to possess a monopoly of legitimate force, 
subject to the right of individuals to act in emergency self-defense. Many 
treat the nondefensive circumstances in which our system decentralizes force 
as holdovers from the days of nonprofessional police and soldiers. When it 
comes to the Second Amendment, many believe that the only legitimate 
reason individuals may bear arms today is for individual self-defense against 
isolated criminal violence (e.g., to resist a home invasion). 
This Symposium Essay attacks the monopoly-of-force account, 
justifying the continued relevance of American law’s decentralization of 
legitimate force. This Essay argues that decentralization of force remains 
important for three reasons. First, despite the rise of professional police, 
American law enforcement still enforces core crimes below desirable levels, 
particularly in disadvantaged and rural communities and during times of civil 
unrest. Decentralization of force mitigates this underenforcement problem. 
And decentralization may be a better solution than providing more police 
because many areas where law is underenforced also (paradoxically) suffer 
from the effects of overcriminalization. Second, American law has a 
mismatch between public duties and private rights. Providing effective law 
enforcement is only a public duty. Individuals have no private claim that the 
government adequately enforce the law or protect them against unlawful 
violence. Self-help and private law enforcement are the best remedies when 
governments undersupply needed levels of police protection. Third, even if 
the government has a monopoly of force, it does not follow that government 
officers are the only ones in whom the government’s monopoly may be 
vested. The “government” is an incorporeal entity whose power must be 
exercised by human agents. Agents do not perfectly carry out the tasks of 
their principals; some government officers commit malfeasance and 
nonfeasance. The decentralization of force provides a remedy for such 
abuses of office. 
Ultimately, this Essay concludes that the individual right to bear arms 
still has relevance for public defense and security. This fact should warrant 
consideration when determining the scope of the right, including that the 
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arms protected by the Second Amendment should continue to include those 
arms that are primarily useful for public security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis police arrested George Floyd on 
suspicion of using a counterfeit $20 bill to purchase cigarettes.1 When police 
tried to put Floyd into a police vehicle, Floyd actively resisted, indicating 
that he was claustrophobic.2 Floyd’s struggle with police led him to fall to 
the ground.3 Once on the ground, Floyd was restrained by Officer Derek 
Chauvin, who placed his knee on Floyd’s neck.4 Despite protests from Floyd 
that he could not breathe, Chauvin kept his knee on Floyd’s neck for more 
 
 1 George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726 [https://perma.cc/U4RA-NEUQ]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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than nine minutes.5 Floyd fell unconscious, and he was pronounced dead 
shortly thereafter.6 
Floyd’s death triggered protests throughout the United States. 7 
Although most protests were peaceful,8  some were not. Violent protests 
caused at least five deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars of property 
damage. 9  Protesters have targeted symbols they view as racist and 
oppressive, including statues of prominent Confederate officials, 
Christopher Columbus, and various conquistadors.10 
In some places, police have been accused of using excessive force to 
quell the protests.11 In others, however, police have been accused of not 
doing enough. In Minneapolis, for example, police abandoned the police 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 ACLED, DEMONSTRATIONS & POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: NEW DATA FOR SUMMER 2020 
(2020), https://acleddata.com/2020/09/03/demonstrations-political-violence-in-america-new-data-for-
summer-2020/ [https://perma.cc/MZ9C-WP39]. 
 8 See id. 
 9 Campbell Robertson, Rick Rojas & Kate Taylor, After George Floyd’s Death, Toll Rises in Protests 
Across the Country, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/george-floyd-
unrest-toll.html [https://perma.cc/5TKX-N6ZA]; see Nellie Bowles, Abolish the Police? Those Who 
Survived the Chaos in Seattle Aren’t So Sure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/us/defund-police-seattle-protests.html [https://perma.cc/MA4D-
LDUR] (reporting uninsured losses from property damage). 
 10  See, e.g., Alan Taylor, The Statues Brought Down Since the George Floyd Protests Began, 
ATLANTIC (July 2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2020/07/photos-statues-removed-george-
floyd-protests-began/613774/ [https://perma.cc/W7XN-J4P6] (listing twenty-seven statues that have 
been vandalized or removed); Jason Slotkin & Vanessa Romo, Suspect in Shooting at Albuquerque Statue 
Demonstration Faces New Charges, NPR (June 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-
protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/17/879410425/man-charged-over-shooting-at-albuquerque-statue-
protest [https://perma.cc/T4H6-TKN3] (reporting that protesters in New Mexico attempted to topple a 
conquistador statue). 
 11 See, e.g., Byron Tau, National Guard Officer Says Excessive Force Used to Clear Lafayette Square 
in D.C., WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/national-guard-officer-says-
excessive-force-used-to-clear-lafayette-square-in-d-c-11595964048 [https://perma.cc/M35Z-GW4Q] 
(reporting allegations of excessive force in the removal of protesters near the White House); Deborah 
Bloom, U.S. Watchdog to Probe Use of Force in Portland; Federal Agents to Seattle on Standby, 
REUTERS (July 23, 2020, 4:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-race-portland-protests/u-
s-watchdog-to-probe-use-of-force-in-portland-federal-agents-to-seattle-on-standby-idUSKCN24O14G 
[https://perma.cc/7HCM-KFPC] (reporting that the Department of Justice “would investigate the use of 
force by federal agents against protestors in Portland”); George Floyd: Videos of Police Brutality During 
Protests Shock US, BBC NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52932611 
[https://perma.cc/BFC8-UMTX] (collecting videos of alleged uses of excessive force by police during 
protests); Matthew Hendrickson & Matt Kiefer, Record Number of Complaints Filed Against Chicago 
Police During George Floyd Protests, CHI. SUN TIMES (July 12, 2020, 7:13 PM), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/7/12/21308535/record-number-complaints-filed-against-chicago-
police-george-floyd-protests [https://perma.cc/S66V-L4DE] (reporting complaints against the Chicago 
Police Department). 
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station in the third precinct, allowing rioters to burn it.12 In Seattle, protesters 
purported to establish a police-free “autonomous zone.”13 One can find other 
examples.14 
In addition to these protests, ordinary criminal violence spiked over the 
summer of 2020.15 Homicides in major U.S. cities increased by 37%, with 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia leading the increase.16 Aggravated 
assaults were up by a similar number, with Chicago, Detroit, Louisville, and 
Nashville primarily responsible. 17  Robbery was up 27%. 18  It has been 
reported that some police officers, in response to public criticism, 
consciously decided not to vigorously enforce the law.19 
And if the rise in violence and violent protests were not enough, 
Americans have also reeled from a pandemic caused by a novel coronavirus, 
 
 12 See Andrew Tangel, Joe Barrett & Erin Ailworth, ‘We’re Just Going to Walk Away from This?’ 
How Minneapolis Left a Police Station to Rioters, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2020, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/were-just-going-to-walk-away-from-this-how-minneapolis-left-a-police-
station-to-rioters-11593595802 [https://perma.cc/KEA6-PFKC]. 
 13 Rachel Abrams, Police Clear Seattle’s Protest ‘Autonomous Zone,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/us/seattle-protest-zone-CHOP-CHAZ-unrest.html [https://perma. 
cc/YB4U-6XHF]. 
 14 See, e.g., Everton Bailey Jr., Oregon Voters Disapprove of Portland Protests, Feel Police Aren’t 
Using Enough Force, Poll Finds, OREGONIAN (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/ 
2020/09/oregon-voters-disapprove-of-portland-protests-feel-police-arent-using-enough-force-poll-finds. 
html [https://perma.cc/K7T2-CENU] (reporting polls showing that most Oregon voters believed that 
police did not adequately keep the peace); Annie Sweeney, Gregory Pratt & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago 
Police and City Leaders Defend Handling of Protests and Looting as Questions Swirl over Response 
Some Found Lacking, CHI. TRIB. (June 2, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-
justice/ct-chicago-unrest-policing-20200602-bdjvkhctsbfa3n2sfr5tqdgxje-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
G375-HMVJ] (reporting allegations from Chicago residents that the police largely stood down in the face 
of rioting and looting). For a similar account from the 2015 Baltimore protests, see Elizabeth Chuck, 
Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake Under Fire for ‘Space’ to Destroy Comment, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2015, 11:05 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/mayor-stephanie-
rawlings-blake-under-fire-giving-space-destroy-baltimore-n349656 [https://perma.cc/FW6V-3ESC], 
which reported a Baltimore mayor’s comment that “we also gave those who wished to destroy space to 
do that as well.”  
 15 See RICHARD ROSENFELD & ERNESTO LOPEZ, NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST., 
PANDEMIC, SOCIAL UNREST, AND CRIME IN U.S. CITIES 3 (2020), https://covid19.counciloncj.org/2020/ 
07/28/crime/ [https://perma.cc/3JTT-QPDM] (tracking crime data from over two dozen American cities). 
 16 Id. at 6. 
 17 Id. at 7. 
 18 Id. at 10. 
 19  See Alec MacGillis, How to Stop a Police Pullback, ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/how-stop-police-pullback/615730/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4EGR-DEV9]. 
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COVID-19.20 As of August 2021, the pandemic has infected over 36 million 
Americans and killed over 600,000.21 
These events have profoundly shaken Americans’ belief in their 
personal security, and they are buying guns at record rates. In June 2020 
alone, Americans purchased over 2 million guns.22 Brookings estimates that 
from March to June, Americans purchased 3 million more guns than in a 
typical year.23 By September 1, 2020, U.S. gun sales for the year exceeded 
the total sales in 2019,24 and the year ended with Americans purchasing about 
23 million total firearms.25 Handgun sales heavily outpaced the sale of rifles 
and shotguns, both in absolute numbers and in the relative size of the 
increase.26 
Not only are Americans buying guns at record rates but many are also 
engaged in activities more traditionally associated with professional law 
enforcement. In nearly three dozen states, armed civilians have taken to the 
streets, ostensibly to protect against violence to persons and property.27 They 
are defending businesses, confronting protesters attacking statues, and, in at 
 
 20 See John Elflein, Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the U.S. - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (May 7, 
2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/6084/coronavirus-covid-19-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/9YC7-
HLVD]. 
 21 See COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/ 
covid-data-tracker [https://perma.cc/NN9J-ZUWQ]. 
 22 See Press Release, Small Arms Analytics & Forecasting, U.S. Firearms Sales: June 2020 Unit 
Sales Soar Once More (July 1, 2020), http://smallarmsanalytics.com/v1/pr/2020-07-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L79F-BNM8]; Stephanie Pagones, Gun Sales Soar 145% in June amid Protests, 
Coronavirus Pandemic, FOX BUS. (July 1, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/gun-sales-june-
coronavirus-pandemic-protests [https://perma.cc/RMP6-ZJLY]. 
 23 Phillip B. Levine & Robin McKnight, Three Million More Guns: The Spring 2020 Spike in 
Firearm Sales, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/13/three-
million-more-guns-the-spring-2020-spike-in-firearm-sales/ [https://perma.cc/9CVA-F66F]. 
 24  See Press Release, Small Arms Analytics & Forecasting, U.S. Firearms: Year-to-Date Sales 
Exceed All of 2019 (Sept. 1, 2020), http://smallarmsanalytics.com/v1/pr/2020-09-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WQ76-5G2W]. 
 25 See Press Release, Small Arms Analytics & Forecasting, U.S. Firearms Sales December 2020: 
Sales Increases Slowing Down, Year’s Total Sales Clock In at 23 Million Units (Jan. 5, 2021), 
http://smallarmsanalytics.com/v1/pr/2021-01-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB5Z-ACQZ]. By comparison, 
Americans purchased 14 million firearms in 2019. Guns in the U.S.: 20 Years of State & Federal Data, 
SAFEHOME.ORG (Feb. 2021), https://www.safehome.org/data/firearms-guns-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3BYW-G9DD]. 
 26 See Press Release, supra note 24 (discussing handgun and long-gun sales through September 
2020).  
 27 See Heath Druzin, Bolstered by Lax Gun Laws, Armed Protesters Confront Anti-Racism Rallies, 
BOISE STATE PUB. RADIO (June 30, 2020), https://gunsandamerica.org/story/20/06/30/blm-protests-
counter-armed-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/GE8N-U9AM]; Armed White Men Patrolling Kenosha 
Protests Organized on Facebook, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2020, 5:21 PM), theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/aug/26/kenosha-militia-protest-shooting-facebook [https://perma.cc/8LL2-5W4D] (reporting 
that a Facebook post “urged armed citizens to protect their lives and property”). 
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least one prominent case, guarding the curtilage of their home against 
allegedly trespassing protesters.28 Simply put, many Americans are resorting 
to self-help rather than putting their faith in the government to provide 
protection. 
This resort to self-help has become a Rorschach test for the role of the 
Second Amendment during civil unrest. Many favoring an expansive Second 
Amendment praise the efforts at self-reliance and lament the police response 
to the protests.29 Referencing a seventeen-year-old boy who shot and killed 
two individuals with an AR-15 rifle while patrolling Kenosha, Wisconsin, 
Fox News commentator Tucker Carlson controversially asked, “How 
shocked are we that seventeen-year-olds with rifles decided they had to 
maintain order when no one else would?”30 
In contrast, many favoring stricter gun controls are horrified, 
contending that armed civilian peacekeepers usurp the state’s monopoly of 
force.31 They see untrained civilians supplanting the role of trained police in 
managing the protests. A New Mexico district attorney even sought an 
injunction against members of a militia group. 32  Gun-control supporters 
often advocate for severely limiting the kinds of arms in civilian hands, 
believing that nonsporting weapons belong exclusively in the hands of the 
military and police.33 
 
 28 See Druzin, supra note 27; Slotkin & Romo, supra note 10; Rachel Rice & Kim Bell, Couple 
Points Guns at Protestors Marching to St. Louis Mayor’s Home to Demand Resignation, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (June 29, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/couple-points-guns-
at-protesters-marching-to-st-louis-mayor-s-home-to-demand-resignation/article_9edc57ed-c307-583f-
9226-a44ba6ac9c03.html [https://perma.cc/8GZC-9MQG]. 
 29 See, e.g., David Harsanyi, The Riots and Protests Will Make Gun Ownership More Popular, NAT’L 
REV. (June 18, 2020, 11:52 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2020/07/06/a-second-
amendment-moment/ [https://perma.cc/AK2E-6FNV] (arguing that riots, protests calling for defunding 
the police, and the perception of helplessness caused by COVID-19 revitalized Americans’ interest in the 
Second Amendment and self-defense). 
 30 Tucker Carlson Tonight (Fox News television broadcast Aug. 26, 2020). 
 31 See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Gun Laws Were Meant to Ban Private Militants. Now, Our Hands 
Are Tied, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/02/ 
militants-kenosha-vigilante-second-amendment-law/ [https://perma.cc/G9U3-AHL3] (arguing that “it’s 
better to entrust law enforcement to professionals accountable to the people—rather than to private groups 
accountable to no one”). 
 32 Verified Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 2–5, State ex rel. Torrez v. N.M. Civ. 
Guard, No. D-202-CV-2020-04051 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 13, 2020), https://www.law.georgetown. 
edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2020/07/State-v.-NM-Civil-Guard-Filed-Verified-Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KQC9-TG22]. 
 33 See, e.g., Nate Bethea, Essay, I Used an Assault Rifle in the Army. I Don’t Think Civilians Should 
Own Them., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/magazine/i-used-
an-assault-rifle-in-the-army-i-dont-think-civilians-should-own-them.html [https://perma.cc/7HKG-
3WEQ] (highlighting the perspective of one former soldier who believes that civilians should not own 
military-style rifles because they should be reserved for the “battlefield”); infra note 58. 
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Both these perspectives share the same starting assumption: that the 
government ordinarily has a monopoly of force, which it exercises through 
government officers and employees, including the military and police. (I will 
call this the “strong” monopoly-of-force view.) Self-defense by private 
citizens exists as an exception when the government’s monopoly of force 
would be ineffective to protect against harm. Both sides may end up with 
divergent conclusions about the legitimacy of self-help in particular cases, 
and the right to bear arms more generally, because they disagree profoundly 
about whether the government is, in fact, sufficiently protecting the people 
in its jurisdiction. Those who think the government is not sufficiently 
protecting its people naturally believe in wider self-help rights, while those 
who think the government is doing so believe in more regulation. But the 
initial premise—that the state ordinarily has a monopoly of force and that it 
exercises that monopoly through government agents—is shared by both 
sides of the debate. 
This premise, however, runs counter to a centuries-long tradition of 
Anglo-American law decentralizing the use of force. Since the Middle Ages, 
private citizens have had robust authority to make arrests for public crimes, 
to use force to keep the public peace, and to keep and bear arms.34 In fact, 
the decentralization of force was so important to Americans in the eighteenth 
century that the Framers created a limited federal government, divided 
control of the country’s military forces between federal and state 
governments, and explicitly reserved the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms.35 
This decentralization of violence is compatible with two philosophical 
understandings of the state’s role in legitimate violence. 36  The first is 
complete decentralization: that although the government may be a source of 
legitimate violence, it is one of many sources over which no person or entity 
has a monopoly. The second is a weak or partial monopolization: the 
government (outside of emergency self-defense) has the monopoly to 
determine who will use force, but the government may authorize state or 
nonstate actors to exercise that authority. The conceptual space between 
these visions is small, though arguably significant for political theory. I will 
 
 34 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1195–98 (1999) (tracing 
the history of Anglo-American policing); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. 
SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 21–28 (2009) (describing the hue and cry and the frankpledge 
system). 
 35 Robert Leider, Federalism and the Military Power of the United States, 73 VAND. L. REV. 989, 
994–95, 1014–16 (2020). 
 36  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS, AN ESSAY ON THE MODERN STATE 203–04 (1998) 
(discussing whether states have an actual monopoly of force and whether states have claims to be the sole 
deciders for when private force is legitimate).   
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not purport to settle on one of them in this Essay. The argument that follows 
is consistent with both. 
This Symposium Essay justifies why the American system of 
decentralized violence remains preferable to the government having a 
complete monopoly of force, particularly in times of emergency and civil 
unrest. The strong monopoly-of-force approach has three principal 
shortcomings. 
First, the supply of law enforcement falls far short of demand.37 Despite 
the rise of professional police, underenforcement of law remains a key 
problem, one which disproportionately affects disadvantaged areas and 
groups. This problem becomes more widespread in times of civil unrest. 
During such times, supplementary state aid, such as resort to the Armed 
Forces and National Guard, may eventually supply the needed policing 
services, but that aid takes time. Massive destruction often occurs in the 
interim. Decentralizing force allows private citizens to defend their interests 
and to protect the public when the government underenforces the law. 
Decentralizing force also avoids the pitfalls of hiring more police. Many 
areas that suffer from underenforcement concomitantly suffer the effects of 
overcriminalization (e.g., harsh enforcement of drug laws and other 
regulatory crimes). Private law enforcement allows citizens to protect their 
interests while not risking the externalities caused by excessive enforcement 
that can come from flooding areas with more professional police. 
Second, with respect to the obligation of the state to protect its citizens, 
Anglo-American law has a mismatch between duties and rights.38 Under the 
public-duty doctrine, the government is under no obligation to furnish any 
individual citizen with police protection or law enforcement. So even if the 
state has some obscure public duty to furnish police protection in general, 
individuals lack any means of enforcement when the government refuses to 
protect them. Recognizing the legitimacy of self-help and law enforcement 
by private persons fills the gap between public duties and protecting private 
rights. Moreover, it prevents the need for courts to deem police protection to 
be a private right. Although recognizing police protection to be a private 
right would seem like an easy fix, such a reversal in traditional public law 
doctrine would severely intrude on the separation of powers. Courts would 
be placed in the position of second-guessing executive enforcement 
decisions and priorities, and judges and juries would essentially act as super-
superintendents of police. 
 
 37 See infra Section II.A.  
 38 See infra Section II.B. 
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Third, even if the government has a monopoly of force, that does not 
imply that the government’s monopoly may only be exercised through 
professional state employees.39 Quite the contrary, state agents are imperfect 
agents of state power. As recent civil unrest has shown, individual state 
agents—including police officials and prosecutors—may refuse to exercise 
state power to punish those who have violated the law by breaching the peace 
and violating others’ rights. In many cases, an executive officer’s refusal to 
enforce the law raises serious claims about whether that official legitimately 
exercises the right to use force (or not to use force) on behalf of the state. 
Private force mitigates the problem of state-agent malfeasance or 
nonfeasance. When citizens protect themselves against unlawful violence 
and civil unrest, citizens act both in private self-defense and on behalf of the 
state in keeping the peace. They have a legitimate claim that they are 
exercising whatever monopoly of force the state has—and a much more 
legitimate claim than an executive official who turns a blind eye to violence 
that society has made unlawful through democratic legislation. In these 
cases, diffusing state power to private citizens provides a means to prevent 
improper circumvention by executive officials of their duties to the public to 
faithfully enforce the law. 
How does all this relate back to the Second Amendment? The right to 
bear arms plays a critical role in decentralizing executive power. Just as 
“[t]he war power of the national government is ‘the power to wage war 
successfully,’”40 the right of self-defense and the power to enforce the law 
must include some power to exercise these functions successfully.41 The 
possession of weapons plays a crucial role in this by allowing those of 
unequal strength, power, and numbers to overcome their adversaries. When 
those adversaries are individuals acting illegitimately against the public 
peace, the private right to bear arms serves both private and public ends. And 
that right takes on added significance when government agents are unable or 
unwilling to supply the necessary police protection. In these cases, 
individuals may need appropriate weapons for self-defense and to keep the 
public peace. Relatedly, the types of arms that they may need are those that 
are appropriate for these tasks. Extensive restrictions, for example, on the 
civilian possession of less-than-lethal weapons (e.g., tear gas) may 
counterproductively increase the amount of lethal force individuals may 
have to employ in emergencies. And prohibitions on the civilian possession 
 
 39 See infra Section II.C. 
 40 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 767 n.9 (1948) (quoting Charles E. Hughes, War Powers 
Under the Constitution, 2 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 9 (1917)). 
 41 Cf. Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Constitutional rights . . . implicitly protect those closely related acts necessary to their exercise.”). 
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of heavier weapons (e.g., rifles with high-capacity ammunition magazines) 
may make it impossible for grossly outnumbered individuals to protect 
themselves against lawless mass violence and for communities to restore 
order when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. 
Thus, we should be wary of claims that the Second Amendment is 
compatible with permitting only the police and military to use arms primarily 
appropriate for enforcing the laws. Quite the contrary, the Second 
Amendment recognizes the longstanding Anglo-American tradition of 
decentralizing the means of political violence. That statement may terrify 
many. But properly decentralized political violence assists the state in 
keeping the peace and enforcing the law, provides a check against private 
and public forms of domination, reinforces separation of powers, and 
promotes individual liberty and security. 
I. WHAT MONOPOLY OF FORCE? 
A. Conventional Monopoly-of-Force Accounts 
In the Second Amendment and criminal law contexts, many 
contemporary scholars have assumed some form of the “monopoly of force” 
mantra. Under the monopoly-of-force approach, the government supplies 
preventative policing and law enforcement. That is, the government has the 
exclusive right to use force to prevent crimes, enforce the law, and punish 
wrongdoers. Private individuals retain the right to use force only in self-
defense against imminent threats. 
The idea that the government should have a monopoly of legitimate 
force is an old one.42 John Locke, whose writings influenced our Framers, 
was a prominent proponent of this view. Locke argued that individuals in the 
state of nature have both a right to preserve themselves and a right to punish 
wrongdoing. 43  But having private persons exercise these rights creates 
problems. In any dispute, private persons will favor their own interests, they 
are liable to punish too much, and, even if their claims are rightful, they may 
lack the raw power to see justice done over a stronger adversary.44 
The formation of government mitigates these problems.45 In forming 
the social contract, a person entirely gives up his right to punish, and he 
 
 42 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 150–52 (Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (describing a social contract in which people transfer to the sovereign the right 
to enforce the law and use force on their behalf, except such force as is necessary for self-defense). 
 43 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 67 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 
1980) (1690). 
 44 See id. at 66. 
 45 See id. at 66–67. 
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subjects his right to preserve himself to the laws of society.46 Individuals, 
however, cannot transfer their right of immediate self-defense against unjust 
deadly threats to the government because the law cannot adequately redress 
such violence.47 In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke summed it up 
this way: “[A]ll Force (as has often been said) belongs only to the Magistrate; 
nor ought any private Persons, at any time, to use Force, unless it be in Self-
defence against unjust Violence.”48 
A monopoly-of-force account can come in a strong and a weak 
interpretation. The strong interpretation is that the government, through its 
officers and agents, has the exclusive right to use force to keep the peace and 
enforce the laws. Under the strong view, private preventative force and law 
enforcement usurp the province of the government.49 Private citizens are 
restricted to acting only in individual self-defense against immediate danger. 
The weak interpretation, in contrast, accepts that the government may be the 
ultimate decider of when force is permissible for preventative policing and 
law enforcement, but it breaks from the strong view by recognizing that the 
government may delegate its preventative policing and law enforcement 
authority in diverse ways, including to private citizens.50 
The strong interpretation of the monopoly-of-force account seems to 
prevail among those who interpret the Second Amendment narrowly or 
advocate its repeal. Many of these scholars treat the Second Amendment as 
an “anachronism.”51 When the Amendment was adopted, American society 
lacked professional police and a capable standing army. Today, in contrast, 
they argue that the federal army has supplanted the militia, and “the 
development of professional police . . . limit[s] the need for individuals and 
 
 46 Id. at 67; see also id. at 47 (describing the original power of civil society).  
 47 See id. at 15, 105. 
 48 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 1, 19 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010). 
 49  See Sklansky, supra note 34, at 1188 (describing others’ view that “peacekeeping, property 
protection, and law enforcement are often considered the clearest examples of functions that are 
essentially and necessarily public”). 
 50 I have previously advocated the weak interpretation when justifying why the government may 
authorize private citizens to use nondefensive deadly force to capture fleeing felons. See Robert Leider, 
Taming Self-Defense: Using Deadly Force to Prevent Escapes, 70 FLA. L. REV. 971, 1016–17 (2018). 
 51  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 206–07 (2009); Lawrence Friedman, The 
Supreme Court and Its Big Second Amendment Problem, HILL (Mar. 1, 2018, 2:00  
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/376284-the-supreme-court-and-its-big-second-amendment-
problem [https://perma.cc/74K2-JQ4J]; see also David E. Bernstein, The Right to Armed Self-Defense in 
Light of Law Enforcement Abdication, 19 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 182–84 (2021) (collecting these 
and similar comments in academic literature and the popular press). 
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groups to engage in self-help.” 52  Stated differently, these scholars view 
private citizens’ historical contribution to peacekeeping and national defense 
as a necessary evil. The Constitution authorized this because, at the time of 
the Framing, it was not possible for the government to have an effective 
monopoly of force. Now that the government has it, the Constitution’s 
decentralization of force should go the way of the horse and buggy. 
To the extent that these scholars recognize any Second Amendment 
right at all, they recognize something fundamentally different from what the 
Framers had in mind. From the Framing through the nineteenth century, 
American law strongly protected the right of citizens to have arms of a kind 
used in war and public defense. The Militia Act of 1792 required able-bodied 
citizens to possess muskets appropriate for military service. 53  American 
judicial decisions throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century left no question that the core of the right to bear arms was the right 
to keep and bear muskets and rifles of a kind employed in civilized warfare.54 
 
 52 Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of Originalism, 
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 190 (2000); see also Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment 
Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 323 (2000) (“To the extent that the Second Amendment ‘right’ 
to bear arms was in substantial measure a duty of the responsible citizenry to participate in the collective 
self-defense of the community, i.e., to the extent that it was understood as a liberty of the ancients, the 
government may be understood to respect that right today by maintaining professional police.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 53 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271. 
 54 See, e.g., Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159–61 (1840) (“The legislature, therefore, 
have a right to prohibit the wearing or keeping weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, 
and which are not usual in civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence . . . . The 
arms, consist[] of swords, muskets, rifles, etc. . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 
(3 Heisk.) 165, 179 (1871) (“What, then, is he protected in the right to keep and thus use? Not every thing 
that may be useful for offense or defense; but what may properly be included or understood under the 
title of arms, taken in connection with the fact that the citizen is to keep them, as a citizen. Such, then, as 
are found to make up the usual arms of the citizen of the country, and the use of which will properly train 
and render him efficient in defense of his own liberties, as well as of the State. Under this head, with a 
knowledge of the habits of our people, and of the arms in the use of which a soldier should be trained, we 
would hold, that the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and repeater, are such arms; and 
that under the Constitution the right to keep such arms, can not be infringed or forbidden by the 
Legislature.” (emphasis omitted)); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871) (“The word ‘arms’ in the 
connection we find it in the Constitution of the United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, 
and the word is used in its military sense. The arms of the infantry soldier are the musket and bayonet; of 
cavalry and dragoons, the sabre, holster pistols and carbine; of the artillery, the field piece, siege gun, and 
mortar, with side arms.”); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874) (“The word ‘arms,’ evidently means the 
arms of a militiaman, the weapons ordinarily used in battle, to-wit: guns of every kind, swords, bayonets, 
horseman’s pistols, etc.”); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 459–61 (1876) (ratifying the Tennessee rule in 
Andrews); State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891) (“So, also, in regard to the kind of arms referred 
to in the amendment, it must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as 
swords, guns, rifles, and muskets,—arms to be used in defending the state and civil liberty,—and not to 
pistols, bowie–knife, brass knuckles, billies, and such other weapons as are usually employed in brawls, 
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These decisions did not always reach agreement on the scope of the right to 
have or carry pistols for self-defense.55 But they were in complete agreement 
on the right to own arms suitable for public defense. The U.S. Supreme Court 
followed this thinking in 1939, when it held that the Second Amendment 
only protected those arms which are “part of the ordinary military 
equipment” or the use of which “could contribute to the common defense.”56 
Now that the government has a supposed monopoly of force, these 
scholars believe that these cases are obsolete because Americans no longer 
need arms for public-defense purposes.57 Many contemporary scholars argue 
that any individual right to bear arms is consistent with “reasonable 
regulations” such as reserving arms useful for public defense and law 
enforcement solely to the police and military.58 As then-Vice President Joe 
Biden put it, “[y]ou don’t need an AR-15” to protect your home, so 
individuals should “[b]uy a shotgun” instead.59 A more scholarly version of 
this view comes from Professor Eric Ruben, who argues that the traditional 
limitations on individual self-defense—necessity, imminence, and 
proportionality—should inform the types of arms that individuals may 
possess.60 
These scholars also oppose the existence of private organizations and 
private groups that have and bear arms. They firmly believe that the heart of 
the government’s monopoly of force is that all organized force must be 
 
street fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, blackguards, and desperadoes, 
to the terror of the community and the injury of the state.” (citation omitted)); Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 
260, 265 (Okla. 1908) (holding that “there is no room for doubt that the arms defendant had a right to 
bear, and which right could never be prohibited to him, relates solely to such arms as are recognized in 
civilized warfare and not those used by the ruffian, brawler, or the assassin”). 
 55 Compare, e.g., Workman, 14 S.E. at 11 (holding no right to own pistols), with Andrews, 50 Tenn. 
(3 Heisk.) at 186–87 (right to carry pistols of a kind used by the military), and State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 
222, 225 (N.C. 1921) (general right to carry unconcealed pistols). 
 56 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 
35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 873 (1960) (“Although the Supreme Court has held this Amendment to include 
only arms necessary to a well-regulated militia, as so construed, its prohibition is absolute.”). 
 57 See supra notes 51–52. 
 58 See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Style, Substance, and the Right to Keep and Bear Assault Weapons, 
40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 301, 303, 327, 332–34 (2018) (advocating for restrictions on military-style 
weapons); John Dwight Ingram & Alison Ann Ray, The Right(?) to Keep and Bear Arms, 27 N.M. L. 
REV. 491, 511 (1997); see also Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 144 (2013) 
(explaining why “urban bans on assault weapons or high-capacity magazines might have a particularly 
strong claim to constitutionality”). 
 59  Joe Biden’s Tip for Self-Defense: Get a Shotgun, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2013, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-biden-idUSBRE91J03720130220 [https://perma.cc/7ZGE-
D2AF]. 
 60 Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 
101–04 (2020); see also id. at 94–101 (using a similar self-defense analysis to demarcate when individuals 
may carry arms in public). 
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government authorized; any organized effort of private citizens to keep the 
peace and publicly bear arms is tantamount to vigilantism. 61  And some 
denigrate the idea that the Constitution could have reserved power in the 
citizenry to resist a tyrannical government, labeling the idea the 
“insurrectionist” theory.62 
On the other side of the Second Amendment debate, many scholars who 
favor a broader understanding of the Second Amendment also accept some 
form of the monopoly-of-force view. Professor David Bernstein, for 
example, argues that the Second Amendment has relevance to “the civil 
unrest” of today because of “[t]he unwillingness or inability of local 
authorities to stop looting, rioting, and other lawless and violent behavior.”63 
Basing the Second Amendment’s relevance on the government’s failure to 
keep the peace seems tacitly to accept the primacy of government agents in 
preventing crime and enforcing the law, while denying the factual premise 
that government agents are adequately securing citizens’ rights. 
Likewise, some individual-rights scholars, including Professor Eugene 
Volokh, agree that the government can prohibit many kinds of weapons and 
accessories primarily useful for public-defense purposes, such as automatic 
weapons, semiautomatic “assault weapons,” and large-capacity magazines.64 
The key question for Professor Volokh seems to be whether the government 
leaves citizens with adequate means of individual self-defense.65 Similarly, 
most courts recognizing an individual right to bear arms for self-defense 
have also accepted the power of the state to ban arms primarily used for law 
enforcement and military applications.66 
 
 61 E.g., Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1993) (“[H]istory 
teaches that the alternative to a state monopoly on organized force is vigilantism.”); Miller, supra note 
31 (“Nothing about the Second Amendment protects armed vigilantism.”).  
 62 See, e.g., Joshua Horwitz & Casey Anderson, Taking Gun Rights Seriously: The Insurrectionist 
Idea and Its Consequences, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 496, 497–98 (2008) (“Insurrectionist ideology holds 
that government, even in its most democratically accountable forms, is inevitably the enemy of freedom, 
and condemns any and all gun regulation as a government plot to monitor gun ownership . . . .”); Dennis 
A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 107, 110–12 (1991) 
(describing the insurrectionist theory as the idea that the right to bear arms is meant to empower the 
citizenry to overthrow tyrannical government at all levels). 
 63 Bernstein, supra note 51, at 179. 
 64  See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1485–87 (2009). 
 65 See id. at 1489 (“[T]hese same reasons probably mean that the magazine size cap would not 
materially interfere with self-defense, if the cap is set at 10 or so rather than materially lower.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding 
“assault weapons” ban); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 269 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(same); Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 335 (Colo. 1994) (same); Benjamin v. Bailey, 
662 A.2d 1226, 1232–35 (Conn. 1995) (same); People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (Mich. 1931) 
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In sum, the conventional understanding is that the government 
maintains a monopoly of force. The use of individual force is reserved for 
cases of immediate self-defense when the government lacks the power or 
willingness to prevent violence. And many scholars accept, explicitly or 
implicitly, that government agents alone may exercise the government’s 
monopoly of force to enforce the law and maintain the peace. 
B. Anglo-American Law and the Strong Monopoly-of-Force Account 
This Section argues against the strong monopoly-of-force account. No 
such monopoly of force has historically existed. And it does not exist today. 
For over a millennium, private citizens have played a large role in 
Anglo-American public security. Blackstone credits King Alfred with 
organizing the “fyrd,” the old Anglo-Saxon militia, 67  while modern 
scholarship suggests that the militia “can be traced back to at least the 
seventh century.”68 After the Norman Conquest, King Henry II reorganized 
the militia with the Assize of Arms in 1181, a law that divided the country 
by wealth and rank, requiring people to acquire private military arms 
according to their means.69 In 1285, the Statute of Winchester further divided 
the English population into income groups, requiring individuals in each of 
the groups to obtain specific military weapons. 70  The law also required 
universal service for all able-bodied men between fifteen and sixty years of 
age.71 
English law did not merely require individuals to obtain and bear arms 
for military purposes; the requirement of citizens to have and bear arms was 
also a staple of domestic policing. The Statute of Winchester devolved 
 
(“Some arms, although they have a valid use for the protection of the state by organized and instructed 
soldiery in times of war or riot, are too dangerous to be kept in a settled community by individuals, and, 
in times of peace, find their use by bands of criminals and have legitimate employment only by guards 
and police.”). The state cases are interpreting state constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to keep 
and bear arms both for self-defense and for defense of the state. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“The 
right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil 
power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question . . . .”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15 
(“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6 
(“Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.”).  
 67  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *409 (“It seems universally agreed by all 
historians, that king Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom, and . . . made all the subjects 
of his dominion soldiers . . . .”). 
 68 William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of 
Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393, 395–96 (1991). 
 69 Assize of Arms 1181, 27 Hen. 2, §§ 1–2 (Eng.); see F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 162 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1908). 
 70 13 Edw. c. 6 (Eng.), in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 96, 97–98. 
 71 Id. 
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policing duties on the entire community. If a felon attempted to resist or flee, 
all able-bodied men had to respond to the “hue and cry” to try to capture the 
person.72 Relatedly, the Statute also held the community collectively liable 
for any robbery within its limits when the felon was not captured.73 This 
system persisted until the 1800s.74 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this civilian-led system 
coexisted with a system of professional soldiers and peace officers, but this 
professional class fell far short of the professionalism we have today.75 For 
foreign wars, Britain traditionally raised professional troops through 
enlistment and impressment.76 Beginning in the seventeenth century, Britain 
maintained a peacetime standing army. 77  But professional soldiers were 
viewed with great suspicion. Soldiers were often alcoholics and petty 
criminals,78 or as Professor Akhil Amar put it, “the dregs of society—men 
without land, homes, families, or principles.”79 The same was true of peace 
officers. Although constables were originally unpaid, conscripted men, those 
men with means would hire deputies, who would then subcontract for further 
deputies.80  The result was that, like soldiers, constables were men “who 
could find no other employment,” resulting in peace officers “of notorious 
incompetence.”81 And the constable’s main purpose was to prevent crimes, 
not to prosecute them; private citizens—the victims—primarily prosecuted 
those who committed crimes.82 
In this country, at the time of the Founding, Americans faced two 
problems, not one, with government force. With an inadequate army and no 
 
 72 Sklansky, supra note 34, at 1196–97. 
 73 Id. at 1196. 
 74 Id. at 1197–1202. 
 75 See RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 20 (enlarged ed. 1984) (“[N]o 
military profession in the modern sense existed at all.”); infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 76 CORRELLI BARNETT, BRITAIN AND HER ARMY 1509–1970: A MILITARY, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
SURVEY 41–42 (1970). 
 77 For a history on the formation of the British peacetime standing army, see CLIFFORD WALTON, 
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH STANDING ARMY: A.D. 1660 TO 1700, at 1–14 (London, Harrison & Sons 1894). 
 78 BARNETT, supra note 76, at 41–42 (describing impressment system that generally caused drunks, 
criminals, and the idle to be enlisted into the professional army). 
 79 See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 53 (1998); see also 
WEIGLEY, supra note 75, at 19 (“Common soldiers were in fact the dregs of European society, vagabonds, 
ne’er-do-well’s, and criminals, the only sorts of men who were willing to risk their lives for the little pay 
bestowed upon them.”). 
 80 Sklansky, supra note 34, at 1197–98. 
 81 Id. at 1198; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *356 (explaining that constables “are armed 
with very large powers, of arresting, and imprisoning, of breaking open houses, and the like: of the extent 
of which powers, considering what manner of men are for the most part put upon these offices, it is 
perhaps very well that they are generally kept in ignorance”). 
 82 Sklansky, supra note 34, at 1198. 
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professional police (America followed the English model when it came to 
policing 83 ), the first problem—the obvious problem—was that the 
government did not have enough centralized force for policing and national 
defense. Decentralization and reliance on nonprofessionals derived from a 
time when the colonies had to rely on private citizens for these public 
functions. 84  But bare necessity was not the only issue. The Founding 
generation also did not trust professional soldiers and peace officers.85 The 
Founding generation viewed professional soldiers as an armed special 
interest faction whose guiding principle was obedience to military hierarchy 
rather than preservation of republican liberty.86 Many felt that professional 
soldiers could either be co-opted by unprincipled rulers to usurp democratic 
government or could usurp democratic government themselves for their own 
benefit. 87  And as just explained, many soldiers and peace officers were 
 
 83  Sklansky, supra note 34, at 1205 (explaining that, for domestic law enforcement, America 
followed the English model, relying on constables, watchmen, and the hue and cry). 
 84 See RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 4 (Enlarged ed. 1984) (1967) 
(“The American colonies in the seventeenth-century were much too poor to permit a class of able-bodied 
men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation of war.”). 
 85 LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 46–48 (1982); Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 
73 (2005) (“By the fall of 1774, opposition to professional soldiering had reached national proportions.”); 
supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 86 See, e.g., Brutus, Essay (Jan. 10, 1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE 
MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE 218, 220 (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS] (explaining that a standing army consists of “a body of men distinct 
from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws, and blind obedience, and an entire 
submission to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle” (quoting 8 COBBETT’S 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1250 (London 1811))); Letter from Samuel Adams to James 
Warren (Jan. 7, 1776), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 1773–1777, at 250, 250–51 (Harry Alonzo 
Cushing ed., 1907) (similar).  
 87 See Letter from Brutus to the People of the State of New-York (Jan. 24, 1788), reprinted in THE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS, supra note 86, at 227, 227; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
598 (2008) (explaining that Framing-era history demonstrated concern that disarming the population 
would “enabl[e] a select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents”); A Ploughman, Letter, 
VA. GAZETTE, Mar. 19, 1788, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 303, 303 (David 
E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995) (objecting that a standing army is necessary if American political officials 
intended oppressive government and explaining the dangers standing armies posed to established 
government); The Republican, Letter, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra, at 188, 190 (“Tyrants never feel secure until they have disarmed the people. 
They can rely upon nothing but standing armies of mercenary troops for the support of their power.”); 
Albany Antifederal Committee, N.Y.J., Apr. 26, 1788, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT, supra, at 337, 337 (“The bane of a republican government; by a standing army most of the 
once free nations of the globe have been reduced to bondage; and by this Britain attempted to inforce her 
arbitrary measures.”); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1890 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“It is against sound policy for a free people to keep 
up large military establishments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, 
with which they are attended, and the facile means, which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled 
rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the people.”).  
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unprincipled men, who were nevertheless vested with the authority of 
government to use force.88 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that, as the Framers increased the 
amount of force available to the federal government, they simultaneously 
provided that no government in the United States would maintain a 
monopoly of force. The Framers divided the military establishment among 
the federal and state governments. The federal government would have near 
plenary control over the professional forces.89 The states would retain usual 
control of the militia (i.e., citizen-soldiers—the nonprofessional forces) and 
could use the militia for domestic law enforcement; these state powers, 
however, were subject to the federal power to organize the militia and to call 
forth the militia for national emergencies.90 The Constitution provided some 
separation among military leaders: the professional services would have 
nationally appointed officers, while the militia would have state-appointed 
officers.91 The Second Amendment protected “the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms,” allowing citizens to possess the means of violence (which 
Anglo-American citizens had traditionally kept since at least the twelfth 
century’s Assize of Arms).92 And the right of the government to employ 
force was diffused by decentralizing political power. The federal government 
would have a few enumerated powers that presumably would not require an 
extensive national law enforcement apparatus. The states would retain the 
police power and, thus, more control over the everyday lives of Americans.93 
The Framers believed that liberty across a large and diverse country could 
be preserved best not by recognizing the government’s monopoly of 
legitimate force, but by actively rejecting it. 
In the nineteenth century, both the American military and American 
policing became truly professional institutions. The universal militia system 
partially gave way to a standing army, led by competent professional officers 
who respected civilian control. 94  In law enforcement, the biggest 
 
 88 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (army); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (navy); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibitions 
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development of the nineteenth century was the rise of professional police 
forces, which both prevented and investigated crimes.95 
Yet, despite the rise of professional military and police, American use 
of force remains decentralized. At first glance, we might think that the 
government in the United States just has a duopoly of legitimate violence—
a “splitting [of] the atom of sovereignty” among the federal and state 
governments. 96  But that small modification fails to capture how 
decentralized the right to violence in this country actually is. State laws are 
mostly enforced not by state officials (though there are some state police), 
but by officials of (nonsovereign) municipal and county governments.97 That 
is to say, although state legislatures make laws, policing is a local function, 
performed by local employees, accountable to local government officials. 
Thus, the duopoly is now a triopoly. 
But we are even more decentralized than that. Government agents also 
can work for private employers. Many police moonlight when off duty—
sometimes in uniform—and many businesses contract with municipal police 
to provide on-duty policing.98 Many states allow private police forces.99 The 
University of Pennsylvania employs sworn police officers with a range of 
law enforcement authority, but they are employed by the university, not by 
a governmental entity.100 Businesses and even governments employ armed 
and unarmed security guards. The people who guard federal courthouses 
carry guns and handcuffs, and they have arrest authority as special deputy 
U.S. Marshals, but they are private contractors, not federal employees.101 
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Private security officers “actually outnumber law enforcement personnel.”102 
And when it comes to political supervision of municipal and county police, 
local governments do not unilaterally set official policies for their law 
enforcement agencies; instead, private insurance companies that indemnify 
local governments for police misconduct play a large role in setting those 
policies.103 
Outside of police and licensed security agents, American law 
recognizes that private citizens may exercise the legitimate use of force. 
Although the precise rules vary by jurisdiction, private citizens retain 
significant authority to make arrests for felonies and breaches of the peace. 
In the case of felonies, private citizens may arrest a suspected person if a 
felony has been committed and they have probable cause to believe that the 
suspected person committed the crime.104 That is only slightly narrower than 
the arrest authority of professional law enforcement, who are excused if they 
have probable cause even if a crime has not, in fact, been committed.105 In 
making arrests, private citizens may use force to effectuate those arrests and 
deadly force in some cases.106 Private citizens may also use force to prevent 
felonies and breaches of the peace.107 In many states, shopkeepers have law-
enforcement-like powers in their stores to detain individuals suspected of 
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stealing based on probable cause.108 And U.S. citizens privately own about 
forty percent of all worldwide firearms,109 giving them ample access to the 
means of violence. 
One might object (and many have objected) that these authorities are 
holdovers from the days of private, communal policing. They argue that 
American law has grown detached from the realities of modern, urban living 
with professional police and military. We should, they say, be curbing 
archaic rules authorizing private citizens to conduct policing activities, and 
we need to more broadly regulate guns.110 
This objection is mistaken. In the next Part, I explain why the reasons 
that animated the Framers to decentralize force remain with us today, even 
in the age of professional militaries and police. 
II. NONDOMINATION AND DIFFUSING THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE 
The previous Section identified two problems with public force at our 
Framing: (1) not enough governmental resources to maintain public security 
with public employees and (2) fear that professional public-security 
employees could oppress the population.111 We can recast these concerns in 
contemporary republican terms. The Framers decentralized force to prevent 
domination by public and private actors.112 Decentralizing force provided a 
check against oppressive governmental actors. And decentralizing force 
allowed private citizens to supplement government officers in preventing 
and punishing crimes, thereby preventing criminals from exploiting honest 
citizens. 
In this Part, I argue that our continued decentralization of force serves 
the same purposes. For three reasons, vesting a near monopoly on the use of 
legitimate violence solely in the government and its agents would be highly 
problematic. First, many areas paradoxically suffer from both lack of 
adequate law enforcement and from overcriminalization. Private law 
enforcement mitigates the underenforcement problem, while avoiding the 
pitfalls of simply hiring more police, which could result in exacerbating the 
disproportionate overenforcement of regulatory offenses. Second, 
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individuals have no private right to policing services. And any attempt to 
convert the public duty to provide policing services into an enforceable 
private right would create severe separation of powers and policy problems. 
Third, state agents may improperly exercise the state’s power to use force in 
two ways. They can commit nonfeasance by improperly refusing to enforce 
the law, and they can commit malfeasance by using force improperly (e.g., 
using excessive force in making arrests). Private law enforcement provides 
an alternative path to combat both forms of misconduct by state agents. Thus, 
the professionalization of the military and the police has not solved the 
resource problem, nor the potential for government officers to oppress the 
population, either directly or through neglect. Decentralizing force remains 
an important way to preserve freedom as nondomination. 
A. Underenforcement of the Law 
Those who believe that private arms bearing is anachronistic assert that 
professional soldiers and police now perform the public security functions 
once played by private citizens. This is wrong. Government agents 
underenforce core crimes, and the problem only becomes more acute during 
times of civil unrest. Private use of force, as a supplement for force by state 
agents, remains an important part of our distribution of legitimate violence. 
While overcriminalization in American criminal law garners significant 
attention—especially now, because of all the allegations of police 
misconduct—underenforcement of criminal law remains a serious 
problem.113 Measured by “clearance rates” (arrests plus offenses cleared by 
exceptional means versus police-reported crimes), police make arrests only 
for 62% of all murders, 33% of all rapes, 30% of all robberies, 14% of all 
burglaries, and 19% of all thefts.114 More generally, official clearance rates 
are around 45% for violent crimes and 15% to 20% for property crimes.115 
But these numbers overstate police effectiveness. Many individuals do 
not report crimes because they may view the crimes as “a personal matter,” 
they may consider the crime insufficiently important, or they fear that they 
would face reprisals or that the police would offer insufficient assistance.116 
Measuring arrests versus crimes reported in the National Crime 
Victimization Survey paints an even darker picture of American law 
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enforcement. In 2018, police cleared about 11% of all known crimes, 
including 62% of murders, 6% of rapes, 14% of robberies, 9% of thefts, and 
6% of burglaries.117 So the vast majority of serious crimes result in no arrests, 
let alone successful prosecutions. 
Making matters worse, the problems caused by underenforcement 
disproportionately harm the poor. Like many government services, policing 
is redistributive. 118  Crime—especially violent crime—is heavily 
concentrated in poor areas.119 Yet, policing is funded by tax dollars coming 
primarily from wealthy and middle-class residents, who need fewer policing 
services because the areas where they live and work are safer.120 The result 
is that governments often allocate public security services to areas where 
they are not needed as much. For example, Alexandra Natapoff reported in 
2006 that “while the Compton area [of Los Angeles] suffers the city’s highest 
homicide rates, it has only seventy-five full-time police deputies, while the 
neighboring southeast division—with dropping homicide rates—employs 
more than 250 officers to patrol a comparable geographical area and has an 
only slightly larger population.”121 In poor urban areas, underenforcement 
results in “unsolved homicides, permitted open-air drug markets, slow or 
nonexistent 911 responses, and the tolerance of pervasive, low levels of 
violence, property crimes, and public disorder.”122 
Underenforcement is not just the result of systemic neglect of politically 
marginalized populations; underenforcement also results from deliberate, 
overt discrimination against disfavored victims.123  During Reconstruction 
and Jim Crow, white murderers were routinely not prosecuted or convicted 
for crimes against African Americans.124 Until the 1970s, police frequently 
did not enforce domestic violence crimes, viewing them as a family issue.125 
As Professor Leon Whipple recognized nearly a century ago, “[I]f we turn 
to the state’s influence on liberty, we find that the most extensive and 
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frequent losses of liberty are not due either to court or executive, but to the 
failure of the force of the government to protect men from violence and 
mobs.”126 
Concerns about underenforcement only get more acute during times of 
civil unrest. In California, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and 
elsewhere, police officers seemingly stood down while protesters engaged in 
violence, burned buildings, and looted stores.127 During the Rodney King 
riots, police were outmanned, leading Los Angeles Police Department 
commanders to order their officers to retreat and hold back.128 This is, in part, 
what led to the famous images of Korean business owners standing on top of 
their stores with semiautomatic rifles to protect their businesses. 129  One 
business owner “would not see law enforcement for three days.”130 In these 
situations, government officials may use the National Guard or the Army to 
reinforce local police. But calling in supplemental forces takes time, and 
enormous destruction occurs in the interim.131 Just look at the destruction 
caused by supporters of President Trump at the U.S. Capitol in 2021, while 
Capitol Police waited for backup from other law enforcement agencies and 
the National Guard to arrive and quell the riot.132 
The harms caused by underenforcement are significant. There are, of 
course, the immediate harms caused by the crimes themselves: bodily injury, 
emotional harm, loss of property, and, in the case of homicides, loss of life. 
But the total harm to the community extends deeper. Underenforcement 
disrupts the ability of all people in the jurisdiction to execute life plans by 
causing them to lose security for their persons and property.133 A person will 
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not invest in a business that he fears will be burned and looted with impunity 
at any moment. Even petty crimes, once aggregated, cause significant losses 
to businesses—losses that may make businesses unprofitable and deprive 
residents of the vital services that the businesses provide.134 The lack of 
physical security limits people’s movements; many residents of high-crime 
areas fear going outside alone and at night.135 And lack of security devastates 
communities. As Professor Thomas Abt describes the cycle, “Fear . . . leads 
to avoidance,” and avoidance causes “the civic and commercial life of those 
locations [to] drain[] away,” in part by “strangling the[] economic prospects” 
of local businesses.136 Places that are violent face depopulation, lower tax 
revenues, fewer government services, and psychological harm to residents, 
especially children.137 Collective violence can be especially devastating for 
communities. The 1968 riots in Washington, D.C. left many neighborhoods 
destroyed for decades; no one rushed in to rebuild.138 
Given that underenforcement remains a serious problem, we should not 
centralize more force in the government by limiting self-help and private law 
enforcement. Many think that only state employees should provide public 
security; they believe in strong civilian gun control and the prohibition of 
citizen’s arrests.139 But vesting a true monopoly of force in the government 
makes this situation worse, not better. When professional police employed 
by the government are insufficient to meet a community’s needs to prevent 
and detect crimes, private law enforcement—whether through neighborhood 
watches, private security officers, or citizen’s arrests—acts as a useful 
supplement. And not only is private supplementation useful, it may also be 
morally required. If the government cannot provide adequate police services, 
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the least it can do is to allow its citizens to protect themselves and to act as 
an auxiliary to the police to enforce the laws. Failing to provide adequate 
police services and prohibiting self-help effectively immunizes the 
wrongdoers, thereby making the government complicit in the wrongdoing.140 
A legal system that does this undermines its own legitimacy.141 
We also have some reason to doubt whether simply providing more 
police would be an acceptable solution. Paradoxically, areas that suffer from 
underenforcement of some crimes also suffer from too much enforcement of 
others. 142  Many criminal laws are broad and vague; virtually everyone 
violates some law, especially traffic offenses. 143  This leaves police with 
significant discretion about whom they wish to detain, search, and arrest.144 
Police do not exercise this discretion evenly; for example, police are more 
likely to stop African Americans than other racial groups.145 Even if the 
traffic offenses themselves are minor, encounters with police increase the 
probability of police detecting further crimes. 146  Moreover, prosecutors 
exercise their substantial prosecutorial discretion “differently in poor city 
neighborhoods than in wealthier urban and suburban communities.”147 As a 
result, some groups face disproportionate prosecution and harsher 
sentencing. 148  Flooding areas with more police could exacerbate this 
problem, as police may seek to improve their careers through making lots of 
easy arrests for drug and other regulatory offenses. When the government 
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has a complete monopoly of force, the line between anarchy and a police 
state can be a thin one. 
Furthermore, vesting powers of arrest exclusively in the police’s hands 
can lead to perverse outcomes. Take, for example, Georgia, which has a new 
law generally prohibiting citizen’s arrests149 but still allows individuals to use 
force in self-defense.150 Imagine that a rioter tries to firebomb an occupied 
house, in which all family members but one are asleep. And for the purposes 
of this hypothetical, imagine that the police do not have enough resources to 
respond quickly to any individual crime. In such a case, the homeowner or a 
bystander would be justified in using deadly force to prevent the arson of an 
occupied dwelling because it is a felony likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury.151 But neither he nor a bystander could capture and detain the 
arsonist for an extended period because that would be an unlawful 
imprisonment.152 The law should not incentivize the use of greater force in 
self-defense by making the ability to detain and arrest unavailable. Equally 
strange, once the person successfully firebombs the house, a victim or 
bystander must let the arsonist go. Although the Georgia law does not repeal 
the use of force in self-defense and defense of others153 (and one might argue 
that, in some cases, detentions constitute a form of defensive force), 
defensive force is preventative only. Once the person consummates the 
crime, there is nothing left to prevent, and thus, any force against the arsonist 
would not be justified on the grounds of self-defense or defense of others. 
A similar problem can occur when governments prohibit private 
citizens from possessing certain weapons primarily useful for public safety 
(e.g., tear gas or stun guns). Consider, for example, the recent case involving 
Mark and Patricia McCloskey in St. Louis. Several protesters allegedly broke 
into their private street by force to protest police violence. 154  The 
McCloskeys claimed that several protesters threatened to burn their home 
and that, in response, they stood in the curtilage of their home with a pistol 
 
 149 H.B. 479, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021) (enacted). For an earlier academic proposal to the same effect, 
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summary of the law authorizing deadly force to protect dwelling, including against arson, see 2 WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6(b) (3d ed. 2020).  
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6, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/why-georgia-shouldnt-repeal-its-
citizens-arrest-law [https://perma.cc/LBN7-Q58D]. 
 153 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-80(d)(1) (2021). 
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and a semiautomatic rifle.155 In this kind of situation, it would be preferable 
for private citizens to have access to various riot-control agents to disperse 
the crowd than to rely on deadly force or threats of deadly force. A similar 
problem exists when a state licenses private citizens to carry firearms but 
prohibits them from having stun guns.156 Lack of access to such less-than-
lethal weapons can perversely cause private citizens to use greater defensive 
force than would otherwise be necessary. 
At the other end of the spectrum, we should also be skeptical of claims 
that semiautomatic rifles belong exclusively to the police. Let me return to 
then-Vice President Joe Biden’s comment that a homeowner should use a 
double-barreled shotgun, not an AR-15, to defend his home. 157  That 
firepower may be sufficient against one not-particularly-determined burglar. 
It would not be adequate for a business owner to secure his business against 
a riot, particularly where the police are unavailable for an extended period of 
time. Relatedly, it may not be entirely coincidental that Judge Kenneth Lee 
authored a Ninth Circuit opinion striking down California’s prohibition on 
large-capacity magazines. 158  Judge Lee grew up in Koreatown in Los 
Angeles and, during the 1992 riots, personally witnessed the business owners 
who had defended their property in circumstances where access to a handgun 
 
 155 Teo Armus & Kim Bellware, St. Louis Couple Point Guns at Crowd of Protestors Calling for 
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POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/the-st-louis-couple-
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mccloskeys-plead-guilty-to-misdemeanors/index.html [https://perma.cc/352U-XBPU], but they were 
almost immediately pardoned by the governor, see Paul LeBlanc & Keith Allen, Missouri Governor 
Pardons St. Louis Couple Who Pointed Guns at Protesters, CNN (Aug. 3, 2021, 8:35 PM), https://www. 
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the protesters might have been a threat to themselves and their home. 
 156  For a case involving the Second Amendment and a ban on stun guns, see Caetano v. 
Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016), which addressed a Massachusetts law that prohibited 
private citizens from having stun guns. 
 157 Joe Biden’s Tip for Self-Defense: Get a Shotgun, supra note 59. 
 158 Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 
988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021). 
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or a taser would have been insufficient and where police protection remained 
unavailable for days.159 
In sum, we should reject claims that in our modern, urban society the 
government’s monopoly of force is adequate to protect everyone within its 
jurisdiction. Professional policing has made long strides since the days of 
incompetent constables, and we may have less need today for citizen’s 
arrests than in centuries past. Yet, underenforcement remains a serious law 
enforcement problem. The decentralization of violence is by no means a 
complete fix. But if the government cannot provide adequate protection—
and often it cannot—then the least it can do is to allow members of the 
community to protect themselves and to preserve law and order. Moreover, 
decentralized law enforcement, unlike hiring more police, may help temper 
the effects of statutory overcriminalization. 
B. The Mismatch Between Public Duties and Private Rights 
Let’s say someone accepts that underenforcement remains a serious 
problem. He might object: “Persistent underenforcement just demonstrates 
that the government needs to provide more law enforcement services. But 
decentralizing violence is the wrong cure.” 
Even if the provision of more governmental law enforcement services 
were the right fix (and I raised doubts about that in Section II.A), our legal 
system lacks any viable coercive means to compel governments to provide 
adequate law enforcement services. In technical legal terms, the provision of 
law enforcement may be a public duty, but it is not a private right. And 
making it a private right would create profound separation of powers 
problems. 
It is hornbook tort law that individuals lack any private right to adequate 
police protection. “The usual rule is that public entities are free of all liability 
for failure to provide police or fire protection, even if that failure was 
negligent. Similarly, statutes and judicial decisions usually exclude liability 
for failure to arrest a dangerous person who later harms or kills others.”160 
The cases establishing the lack of a private right involve heinous facts 
and terrible derelictions of police duty. In Riss v. City of New York, a man 
stalked a young woman and threatened to kill or maim her if she did not 
 
 159 See Korean Federal Judge Helps Strike Down California’s Ban on Large-Capacity Magazine, 
ASIAN DAWN (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.asian-dawn.com/2020/08/15/korean-federal-judge-helps-
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Christina Lin, ‘When Looting Starts, Shooting Starts,’ ASIA TIMES (May 30, 2020) 
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 160 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 22.10 (2d ed. 
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accede to his sexual advances. 161  After the woman became engaged to 
another man, the stalker called her to warn that this was her “last chance.”162 
The woman reported the threat to police and pleaded for protection, but 
police refused to provide it.163  The next morning, someone hired by the 
stalker threw lye in the woman’s face, blinding her in one eye, damaging her 
vision in the other, and permanently scarring her face. 164  Only after the 
disfiguring assault did police provide protection.165 Despite these facts, New 
York’s highest court held that the New York City Police Department did not 
owe the woman any duty of care. The court explained that “[t]he amount of 
protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the community 
and by a considered legislative–executive decision as to how those resources 
may be deployed.”166 The dissent noted the “rather bitter irony [that] she was 
required to rely for protection on the City of New York” because New York 
law prohibited her from being armed for self-defense, and now that she was 
injured, the city “denies all responsibility to her.”167 
In Braswell v. Braswell, a wife left her husband, a deputy sheriff.168 
When the wife informed her husband she was leaving, “he told her that 
neither of them was going anywhere and that if he could not have her, nobody 
could.”169 The wife had already called the sheriff to express her fear that her 
husband would kill her and that he had been handling three envelopes in a 
peculiar manner. She subsequently discovered that the envelopes contained 
notes, stating, in part, “All I can say is son I loved your mother, and I just 
couldn’t stand to see her leave me. . . . Please, Mike don’t hold this against 
me. I know it’s the worst thing any one can do . . . .”170 She reported the 
“gist” of the letters to the sheriff, who sent two deputies to check on the 
husband; the deputies “reported that [the husband] appeared neither 
homicidal nor suicidal.”171 Although the sheriff agreed to have other deputies 
watch the wife, her husband shot and killed her. 172  The North Carolina 
supreme court reaffirmed the common law rule that “a municipality and its 
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agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for 
the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals.”173 The court 
further found that no exception to the public-duty doctrine applied and that 
the sheriff’s promise to watch the wife was not specific enough to create a 
duty.174 
Federal constitutional law recognizes an analogous doctrine: “a State’s 
failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not 
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” 175  In DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, a father beat his son, 
causing the boy to suffer permanent and severe brain damage.176 This came 
after the county’s department of social services received repeated reports, 
including from family members and an emergency room, that the father was 
abusing his son.177 The county offered voluntary counseling to the father but 
decided against removing the boy from the home. The Supreme Court held 
that the county was not liable for a constitutional tort because the Due 
Process Clause protected only against state deprivations of life and liberty, 
not those by private parties.178 
Although these cases involve ordinary criminal violence, the public-
duty doctrine is not so limited. Courts routinely deny similar claims against 
governments and their officers for bodily harm and property damaged caused 
by riots and civil disorder.179 Analogously, courts generally refuse to compel 
prosecutors to enforce the law. Decisions whether to make arrests or 
prosecute are quintessential executive powers, and courts rarely interfere 
with how the executive branch exercises it.180 
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Because of the public-duty doctrine, restrictions on self-defense leave 
a mismatch between public duties and private rights. 181  Even if the 
government is under a duty to provide police protection to the public, no 
individual member of the public has a personal legal right to that protection. 
Thus, if the government refuses to provide adequate preventative policing or 
to investigate crimes that have occurred, a person cannot go to court and 
demand that police provide these services.182 This means that, with respect to 
contemporary civil disorder, individuals in Portland, Seattle, and other areas 
where police have pulled back183 have no legal recourse to compel police to 
protect their lives, homes, and businesses. Nor do those people in areas 
where, in response to public criticism, police refuse to vigorously enforce 
the law. No one has a private legal right that police do their jobs at all, let 
alone that they do them well. 
In terms of retrospective damages, the public-duty doctrine effectively 
leaves victims of crimes and civil disorder severely undercompensated. In 
many cases, victims are unlikely to identify the people causing harm.184 Even 
if they do, the perpetrators are likely judgment proof.185 And the victims have 
no tort claim against the government for failure to protect. Maybe the victims 
have insurance, but even this is uncertain.186 Small business owners may not 
be able to afford such policies. Insurance policies may also refuse to cover 
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damages from widespread harm, such as war or civil disorder, or they may 
only cover part of the losses.187 So not only can potential victims not compel 
police to provide protection, but they lack effective redress should they be 
harmed. 
The public-duty doctrine has been subject to severe criticism, and one 
may object that the public-duty doctrine ought to be abandoned.188 In fact, in 
some cases, Anglo-American law has imposed governmental or communal 
liability for failing to provide adequate protection against violence, 
especially riots.189 
But overturning the public-duty doctrine raises other profound 
problems. Decisions about how to enforce the law and allocate police 
resources are committed to the political branches.190 Treating government 
protection as a private right would place judges and juries above elected and 
appointed officials in determining how many police officers to hire, where 
to station the officers, which laws to enforce, and when to provide private 
individuals and businesses with personal protection.191 Indirectly, it may also 
compel states and local governments to raise taxes so that the government 
can afford the minimum level of protection that the courts will demand ex 
post.192 
Alternatively, courts may hesitate to rigorously enforce a private right 
to police protection, given the uncertainties about how police should be 
allocated. More likely, they would use a tort remedy to curb the worst abuses, 
while immunizing officers for normal failures to provide protection.193 This 
would help the extraordinary plaintiffs—those, for example, in Riss and 
DeShaney—but it would still leave the vast majority of the population 
without any effective remedy against the police for failure to provide police 
protection. And it is unimaginable that courts will second-guess how 
governments deploy the police and National Guard during civil disorder, 
when many lives and businesses may be on the line.194 
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In cases of mob violence, the imposition of governmental liability could 
also prove highly regressive, further damaging impoverished communities. 
Many communities in America remain divided along racial, ethnic, and 
economic lines.195 The burning of a central business district could result in 
poor urban residents indemnifying rich and middle-class suburbanites for the 
losses sustained by their downtown businesses. And even when income does 
not flow across jurisdictions, a city comprised mostly of impoverished 
residents would be hard-pressed to use its scarce tax dollars to insure its 
residents and business owners against the risk of violence. Many such areas 
have trouble even providing basic governmental services in the first place.196 
Even where “riot acts” exist providing for municipal liability for harms 
caused by mob violence, state legislatures and courts have frequently 
cabined the scope of liability. When faced with significant riots, many states 
have suspended or repealed their riot acts.197 In New York, for example, 
legislative suspension occurred “whenever the need for the legislative relief 
was most pressing.” 198  And where a riot causes widespread economic 
disruption, liability has been limited to physical damage to property, 
normally rendering personal injury and economic harm noncompensable.199 
Thus, abrogation of the public-duty doctrine has not reliably solved the 
undercompensation problem. 
The right to use force and the decentralization of executive power fill 
the gap between public duties and private rights. By decentralizing the means 
of violence, the Second Amendment allows individual citizens to have the 
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tools of violence. Armed with such tools, citizens may supplement the 
government’s use of force when that supplementation may be necessary. A 
government that has no complete monopoly of force has no moral 
responsibility to extend supplemental police protection or to indemnify 
citizens for losses caused by other citizens. If governmental protection is 
inadequate, individuals retain their full self-help remedies. And individuals 
are not limited merely to self-help. In our system, individuals also have the 
authority to act on behalf of the state by making arrests and using force to 
prevent forcible felonies and breaches of the peace. In other words, they may 
protect not only themselves, but also their communities. This power takes on 
critical importance when police are unable or unwilling to provide adequate 
protection during times of civil unrest. 
C. State Agents and the Monopoly of Force 
In this Section, I discuss one final, theoretical problem with the strong 
monopoly-of-force view. Even if it is true in some abstract sense that “the 
state” has a monopoly of force, it does not follow that state agents are the 
only people who can exercise force on behalf of the state. To the contrary, 
private citizens may exercise state power. 
The common law has long recognized the power of private citizens to 
use violence on behalf of the state. Take self-defense for example. English 
common law did not recognize a clear private right of self-defense for 
centuries, finally confirming the right in 1532. 200  Under early English 
common law, a person acting in private self-defense needed to secure a 
pardon from the King.201 By the time of the Framing, English common law 
allowed individuals to use deadly force in self-defense, but scholars dispute 
whether the common law justified or merely excused individuals who used 
deadly force for private self-defense. 202  In contrast, English law fully 
justified the use of force to prevent a forcible felony—an act that was taken 
on behalf of the state.203 Of course, these categories overlapped; a person 
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acting to prevent a rape or robbery acted both in personal defense and to 
prevent a felony. But the common law treated private violence more 
favorably when it was used on behalf of the public. 
Conversely, Anglo-American law traditionally did not treat all violence 
by state agents as violence on behalf of the state. Peace officers had wide 
latitude to use force when their actions were authorized by the state.204 But 
absent statutory immunity, when peace officers acted outside the bounds of 
their office, they were treated like private trespassers and subject to both tort 
liability and self-help remedies.205 In essence, the state cut them loose and 
disclaimed their actions. 
Underneath these rules are two important principles. First, even if a 
state has a monopoly of violence, there is nothing inconsistent about 
allowing private citizens to exercise that monopoly on behalf of the 
government. The government’s distinctive claim on those subject to its 
jurisdiction is the duty to have the government’s directives obeyed.206 A 
private citizen enforcing the law consistent with the state’s directives is not 
acting in derogation of the state’s monopoly of force. 
Second, public law enforcement officers, by virtue of their office, do 
not have a claim to be acting on behalf of the state at all times. “The state” 
is an incorporeal entity. Like a corporation, it exercises its power through 
individual agents. But the mere fact that a state agent performs an act does 
not mean that the act should be attributed to the state. Agents can exceed or 
abuse the authority given by their principals. Proper respect for the rule of 
law recognizes that state agents, no less than private citizens, lack a 
legitimate claim to exercise the state’s monopoly of force when they fail to 
properly exercise the authority given by the government. 
Let me put the matter in more concrete terms. In 2020 when Officer 
Derek Chauvin knelt on George Floyd’s neck until he died, Chauvin 
exceeded his authority under state law to use deadly force; he had already 
subdued and handcuffed Floyd, so his continued application of force was not 
necessary to effectuate Floyd’s arrest.207 Because Chauvin’s use of force 
exceeded the bounds of state law, he lost any claim to be exercising the 
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state’s monopoly of force.208 Chauvin became the unlawful aggressor209 (and 
a jury subsequently convicted him of murder210). Should a private citizen 
have intervened—say he pushed the officer off of Floyd’s neck—the private 
citizen would have had the superior claim to exercise the state’s monopoly 
of force, even though Chauvin wore the badge.  
Like actions, omissions are another way in which government officers 
can lose their claim to be properly exercising the state’s monopoly of force. 
The policy of “the state” is not reducible to the policy of its individual law 
enforcement officers, including those who hold high office. Consider, for 
example, recent claims that police and prosecutors have pulled back and are 
refusing to enforce the law diligently. 211  The state made it unlawful to 
commit certain crimes, including violence to persons, destruction of 
property, theft, and rioting. These laws result from a democratic process. 
Suppose after police refuse to enforce the laws against rioting and looting, 
private citizens fill the void. As the enforcer of democratically enacted laws, 
private citizens who enforce these laws have a better claim to be exercising 
the state’s monopoly of force than the police, who are committing 
nonfeasance.212 
Again, we see that the decentralization of force is essential to prevent 
illegitimate domination by public and private actors. As I explained in the 
previous Section, individuals lack any effective remedy against police who 
refuse to enforce the law, and the creation of a judicial remedy would create 
 
 208 Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (“The act to be enforced is alleged to be 
unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the 
injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in 
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in 
attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because 
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal 
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior 
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and 
is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.”). 
 209 See Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492, 499 (Pa. 1995) (explaining that a police officer 
becomes an unlawful aggressor, against whom there exists a right of self-defense, when the officer 
“unnecessarily uses unlawfully excessive or deadly force”). 
 210 Tim Arango, Shaila Dewan, John Eligon & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Derek Chauvin Is Found 
Guilty of Murdering George Floyd., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/ 
20/us/chauvin-guilty-murder-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/E6VL-TC45]. 
 211 E.g., Charles Lipson, The Fiasco of ‘Go Ahead, Break Our Windows’ Policing, REAL CLEAR POL. 
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/08/13/the_fiasco_of_go_ahead_break_ 
our_windows_policing___143946.html [https://perma.cc/VMK3-CME6] (providing examples where 
police allegedly held back and arguing that such pullbacks have been harmful to the community). 
 212 To be clear, I am not advocating that private citizens should have the right to enforce any statute 
on the books that police choose not to enforce. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion partially sets 
criminal law policy, and unrestrained private enforcement can cause private citizens to act like a shadow 
government. I delve into this issue more deeply in Section III.B, infra.  
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profound separation of powers problems. Decentralization of force provides 
an alternative way to bypass executive officers engaged in nonfeasance and 
malfeasance. When police refuse to stop lawless violence, private citizens 
can. So even if a state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, 
nothing inherently requires state officers to exercise the state’s monopoly of 
force. Private citizens may exercise it too. 
III. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
The idea that private citizens may legitimately exercise the state’s 
monopoly of force will prompt several objections. I will consider two main 
objections here, though I have no doubt that more exist. 
A. Private Force and Vigilantism 
The most obvious objection is that this is a call to vigilantism. Private 
use of force and law enforcement will leave individuals at the mercy of 
oppressive private actors. Indeed, this is what prompted many in the United 
States to condemn private police used to suppress labor demonstrations at 
the end of the nineteenth century.213 
To this objection, I have two responses. First, whether private law 
enforcement and use of force are consistent with the state’s use of force 
depends on how they are employed.214 Private use of force may be employed 
in a manner consistent with the state’s objectives and policies or in 
contravention of them.215 This is the difference between Korean business 
owners banding together with semiautomatic weapons to protect their lives 
and property and Shays’s Rebellion,216 in which an armed uprising interfered 
with the ability of courts to foreclose on indebted property. 
Relatedly, one can also distinguish between defensive and offensive 
force.217 Defensive force is the force used to protect against imminent threats 
to persons and property. Offensive force is the kind of force used to 
 
 213 Sklansky, supra note 34, at 1213–14. 
 214  David Sklansky, Private Police & Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 96–101 (2006) 
(discussing private policing as “augmentation, displacement, and transformation” of public policing). 
 215 Cf. Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 176 (2019) (arguing that 
prosecutorial power may be employed in a matter that either “achieve[s] a shared goal” or “mak[es] a 
group of people do what you want”). 
 216  See LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL 
BATTLE 7–10 (2002).  
 217 This concept is adapted from the distinction between defensive and offensive war. See 3 EMER 
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 471 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008) (1797) (“War is 
either defensive or offensive. . . . The object of a defensive war is very simple; it is no other than self-
defence: in that of offensive war, there is as great a variety as in the multifarious concerns of nations: but, 
in general, it relates either to the prosecution of some rights, or to safety.”).   
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implement policy: for example, retaliating against someone to alter their or 
their confederates’ behavior or usurping the state’s role to punish public 
crimes. African Americans who banded together in the South to protect 
themselves against unlawful white violence were engaged in defensive 
violence. The Ku Klux Klan, who used the threat of force to prevent people 
from voting and who engaged in vigilante violence against those they 
accused of crimes,218 were engaged in offensive violence.  
This distinction between offensive and defensive force (or between 
force consistent with the state’s policies and force antagonistic to them) is 
reflected in historical English law. Under English common law, groups of 
people armed with unusual weapons might constitute an unlawful 
assembly.219 But an individual could assemble “neighbours and friends in his 
own house, against those who threaten to do him any violence therein”—that 
is, to assemble force in private self-defense.220 And individuals could arm 
themselves in public with dangerous or unusual weapons “to suppress 
dangerous rioters, rebels, or enemies” in order “to suppress or resist such 
disturbers of the peace”—that is, they unquestionably had the right to bear 
arms to further collective security.221 
Returning to the objection, I agree about the dangers of having private 
citizens engaged in unauthorized offensive force. Again, the distinctive 
claim of a state on its citizens is a claim to have the state’s directives 
obeyed.222 When private groups band together in an offensive manner, they 
are creating a de facto shadow government. Private force can be a political 
problem not because it is private, but because it becomes the means of 
imposing illegitimate rule. In other words, offensive force weakens the 
state’s claim to have its directives obeyed. Defensive force does not.223 
 
 218 See Jared A. Goldstein, The Klan’s Constitution, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 285, 297 (2018) 
(listing the purposes of Klan violence during Reconstruction). 
 219 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 514–15 (John Curwood ed., 
London 1824). 
 220 Id. at 489. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See supra note 206. 
 223 Some decentralization of force in foreign countries reflects the offensive–defensive distinction as 
well. For example, the Israeli government subsidizes organized security at settlements and kibbutzim 
(collective, traditionally agrarian communities), but Israel eliminated the Irgun shortly after the state’s 
founding. Compare Elisha Ben Kimon, IDF to Cut Number of Civilian Guards in Israeli Settlements in 
West Bank, YEDIOTH AHRONOT (June 12, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
5524217,00.html [https://perma.cc/RD2R-L7SP] (discussing Israel’s support of armed civilian guards at 
settlements), with Yehuda Lapidot, The Irgun: The Altalena Affair, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
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Israel’s refusal to allow the Irgun to act as a parallel army after Israel’s independence). Armed security 
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Second, a government monopoly of force does not guarantee freedom 
as nondomination. Police paradoxically are “both a guarantor of the security 
upon which the exercise of liberty depends, and a potent, ever-present threat 
to those very same liberties.”224 The protests that consumed America in 2020 
derived largely from allegations of police misconduct, and many have 
adopted the motto “abolish the police.”225 Presently, a large disconnect has 
emerged among those who both decry the police and who seek to further 
restrain guns and the private use of force. Lest we return to a state of nature, 
someone has to enforce the law and that enforcement must be at adequate 
levels to provide the public with security. But too much centralization has its 
own problems. North Korea and China maintain centralized force. They are 
not governments that we should wish to emulate. Just as vigilantes can abuse 
the decentralization of force, so, too, can government abuse the 
centralization of force. Determining the legitimate allocation of force is more 
nuanced than simply allocating a monopoly to state officials. 
Professor Jacob Charles further objects to my argument that private 
citizens may have a superior claim to exercise executive power on behalf of 
the state when state officers engage in unlawful misconduct or improperly 
refuse to enforce laws that they are sworn to uphold. He contends that this 
claim is insensitive to the realities of racism that pervade modern American 
society, particularly as they concern stereotypes of criminality in American 
culture.226 Decentralization of force, he argues, results in racist vigilantism.227 
Professor Charles, however, fails to explain why decentralized law 
enforcement by private citizens creates peculiar risks of racist policing. Law 
enforcement officers are drawn from the same community as private citizens. 
Social ills that affect the community generally seep into the community’s 
 
organizations at settlements and kibbutzim do not jeopardize the government’s sovereignty in legal and 
political affairs, even though the organized guards are not comprised of government employees; they are 
defensive security forces only. The Irgun, in contrast, was a parallel army implementing its own political 
agenda through offensive military operations. Its abolition at Israel’s founding was necessary to 
consolidate sovereignty in the new Israeli government and to prevent offensive force unauthorized by that 
government. See Irgun Tz’va’I Le’umi (Etzel): Background & Overview, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-the-irgun-etzel [https://perma.cc/ 
2DHQ-K2LS].  
 224 Ian Loader, Plural Policing and Democratic Governance, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 323, 325 
(2000) (citation omitted). 
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Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 51–54), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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governmental institutions, including professional police. Racism is no 
exception.228 In fact, many of the examples Professor Charles cites as racist 
policing—the prosecution of Marissa Alexander for firing a warning shot at 
her estranged husband and the shooting of Philando Castile, who was 
lawfully carrying a firearm—were undertaken by government officers, not 
by private citizens.229 In claiming that decentralized force will result in racist 
vigilantism, Professor Charles fails to grapple with the extensive critical 
literature concerning race and professional law enforcement.230 And he fails 
to contend with the fact that some of the worst historical discrimination 
against minorities and disadvantaged groups has been the failure of 
governments to adequately enforce the law, leaving members of these groups 
vulnerable to private violence.231 
Nor does Professor Charles demonstrate that private citizens’ use of 
force is distinctively problematic compared with that employed by the 
police. A 2019 study reported that “[p]olice violence is a leading cause of 
death for young men, and young men of color face exceptionally high risk 
of being killed by police.”232 “Black men,” the study concluded, “are about 
2.5 times more likely to be killed by police over the life course than are white 
men,” while “Black women are about 1.4 times more likely to be killed by 
police than are white women.”233 Other psychological studies have found that 
“the threshold of the certainty of danger that participants required to shoot a 
black man was significantly lower than the threshold required to shoot a 
white man” and that “[t]his phenomenon . . . has been empirically 
demonstrated in acting police officers at rates substantially similar to the 
general public.”234 Professor Charles gives us no reason to conclude that 
private citizens’ use of force contains greater racial disparities than that of 
the police. And Professor Charles does not establish that private citizens are 
 
 228 See Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and What to Do About It, 
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disproportionately likely to use unjustified force against minorities when 
engaged in self-defense or law enforcement compared with law enforcement 
officers. Professor Charles’s anecdotes of questionable or illegal uses of 
force by private citizens could just as easily be matched with anecdotes from 
professional police. 
Finally, in arguing against decentralized force, Professor Charles’s 
argument ignores that private citizens are more accountable under law for 
improper uses of force. Police officers are clothed with many civil and 
criminal immunities, including broader arrest authority based on probable 
cause alone, more power to use force, and qualified immunity for mistaken 
judgments.235 Juries also tend to be sympathetic to police when they use 
force.236 Other things equal, it is comparatively easier to hold a private citizen 
civilly and criminally liable for improper force than a law enforcement 
officer. 237  The decentralization of force is not a license for unrestrained 
vigilantism. 
B.  Private Law Enforcement and the Overenforcement of Criminal Law 
A second objection concerns the tendency of private law enforcement 
to overenforce our laws. We have moved away from private law 
enforcement, in part, because private law enforcers tend to enforce the law 
too stringently.238 Just because private citizens enforce the laws on the books 
does not mean that they are not engaged in policy setting through their 
enforcement decisions. 
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REV. 689, 725–26 & n.174 (2004) (referencing historical criticism of qui tam statutes). 
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There is no easy answer to this objection. Earlier, I suggested that 
private citizens have a legitimate claim to exercise state power when they 
enforce the law and state agents refuse. I now need to qualify that claim. I do 
not want to suggest that private citizens should have the unqualified right to 
enforce any criminal law on the books. Although police agencies may 
underenforce the law, we simultaneously suffer from statutory 
overcriminalization. The result is that de facto criminal law—the criminal 
law enforced on the streets—is not really statutory. Instead, our criminal law 
remains primarily a common law system, and as a society, we expect 
executive officers to set their enforcement decisions around local and 
national customs. 239  As Professor Kevin McMunigal explains, “[T]he 
distribution of power in regard to criminal lawmaking is considerably more 
complex and nuanced than the notion of legislative supremacy indicates and 
that all three branches of government exercise power in shaping criminal 
law.”240 
I maintain the distinction I set our earlier: private law enforcement 
becomes problematic when citizens use their private enforcement power to 
usurp the state’s role in setting criminal justice policies, but it is not 
inherently problematic for private citizens to enforce the law consistent with 
the state’s established policies. My response to this objection, therefore, is to 
deny that we can draw this line formalistically based on statutory law. We 
affirmatively want some statutory law to go unenforced or to be 
underenforced. Thus, private citizens should not be engaged in private law 
enforcement simply because the government decides not to enforce a 
particular statutory law. 
To give examples, the speed limit on our superhighways is often fifty-
five miles per hour, Wisconsin law makes adultery a felony,241 and federal 
law prohibits medical marijuana.242 As a society, we have decided that we do 
not want government officials enforcing these laws, even as we have failed 
to repeal them. We narrow overbroad statutory criminal law through, among 
other things, legislative decisions (e.g., how we fund law enforcement and 
legislative oversight of the executive branch), elections of executive 
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officials, and jury trials (or plea bargaining under the threat of jury trials).243 
Many of these institutional arrangements do not constrain private law 
enforcement. Yet, private citizens enforcing such laws would be no less 
problematic. 
In the mine-run of cases where citizens use force on behalf of the state, 
the distinction between the technical statutory criminal law and the “real” 
criminal law does not matter. Many cases involve protecting core private 
rights: life, liberty, bodily integrity, and property.244 Traditional common law 
crimes—for example, murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, false 
imprisonment, riot, and theft—invade these interests, and these are the kind 
of crimes that we expect the government to prosecute in all (or nearly all) 
cases where the perpetrators can be found. So, the friction between public 
and private force in such cases is likely to be minimal. 
Private citizens, however, sometimes go further by enforcing mala 
prohibita245 and regulatory crimes. The “Minuteman Project,” for example, 
placed armed civilians on the border to curb illegal immigration. 246  The 
federal government lacks the resources to prevent many illegal border 
crossings,247 and undocumented labor forms an important part of our national 
economy.248 So we tolerate some illegal immigration (the DREAMers are a 
paradigmatic example). Complete enforcement of immigration laws would 
be a major policy change, one that the government should have to make. 
So where, exactly, is the line? I cannot fully answer the question here. 
From custom and tradition, we know which crimes commonly get enforced 
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and which go totally or partially unenforced, even if we have no formal 
compilation of them. Private law enforcement—like its public counterpart—
must be limited to enforcing those crimes that we would expect the 
government to enforce. I do not purport to give a comprehensive list, but I 
will say that private enforcement becomes increasingly problematic when 
we move beyond core mala in se crimes recognized at common law to broad 
statutory offenses that are mala prohibita. 
Finally, I will note that while our legal system has decentralized law 
enforcement, various legal doctrines help contain the potential externalities 
caused by excessive decentralized force. Under modern common law, 
private citizens, when making a warrantless felony arrest, remain strictly 
liable whether a felony was, in fact, committed, and the power of private 
citizens to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests is often limited to breaches 
of the peace committed in their presence. 249  An erroneous decision can 
expose a private citizen to significant civil or criminal liability.250 In contrast, 
public officers may act on probable cause alone, and, subject to the law of 
their jurisdiction, they have more power to make misdemeanor arrests, 
including for any offense committed in their presence.251 Likewise, criminal 
law often gives law enforcement more power to use force than private 
citizens when engaged in law enforcement. 252  The more stringent rules 
applied to private citizens make it practically irrational for them to engage in 
free-floating law enforcement. Private citizens have nothing to gain by 
privately enforcing laws in which they have no personal interest and a 
substantial amount they can lose.  
In sum, I do not deny that unrestrained decentralization of force and 
executive power can create vigilantism no less oppressive than that caused 
by excessive monopolization. A well-run political community checks 
excesses from both directions. 
CONCLUSION 
In federalizing the government, splitting control over the armed forces, 
and protecting the right of the people to keep and bear arms, the Framers 
made a conscious decision to decentralize the right to use force. That 
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decision retains its vitality today. Even with the rise of professional police 
and soldiers, the government does not supply the full quantity of law 
enforcement and security services that the public needs. And while today’s 
soldiers and police officers are better trained and more competent than those 
of centuries ago, problems caused by rogue officers and policymakers 
remain. Decentralization of force remains an important tool to prevent 
private and public domination by those acting outside the law. In a legal 
system where the supply of police is inadequate to meet demand and where 
no one has an enforceable private right to police protection, the government 
has a duty to allow self-help and the means of self-help. The right is 
especially important during times of civil unrest when the government may 
be unable or unwilling to provide security. And the right to bear arms is still 
about more than just individual self-defense. When individuals bear arms, 
they also exercise force on behalf of the community. Professional police and 
soldiers may have reduced the need for private law enforcement, but they 
have not rendered the original Second Amendment obsolete. 
